Between Ambition And Reality

Space is ubiquitous in modern defence: space capabilities are essential in areas such as gathering intelligence, enabling navigation and precision firepower via GPS, and communicating beyond the line of sight. Furthermore, the utility of space increasingly renders capabilities a target for hostile action. Attacks on space-enabled communications services, as seen during the war in Ukraine, are just one example of how counter-space capabilities are already being used. In the future, adversaries may not restrict themselves to non-kinetic means, and space itself might turn into a battlefield.

UK defence views space as both a domain and an enabler, although the balance is skewed towards enablement. It follows that the space domain must be protected to guarantee its utility as an enabler. The mixed message about space given to the services is part of the reason why space is perceived as complicated – it is used by all the armed forces, yet its potential for supporting other domains is not fully understood. A wider understanding of the services and support that space can offer is needed across defence – what it enables, what capabilities are dependent on it, what new vulnerabilities have been exposed as a result, and what investments may be needed to optimise its use. This understanding is important for ensuring that space can continue to be used even when its capabilities are under attack, and so that reversionary non-space-dependent alternatives are developed and trained for, where necessary. UK Space Command will be vital for providing the broader education and wider promotion of space needed across UK defence.

The current approach of treating space as a niche subject area is not only conceptually flawed but also risks leaving space-enabled capabilities vulnerable and space services under-utilised, and reducing the capacity of a growing Space Command to perform its role effectively. This approach has already led to compromises in relation to the Skynet programme that could undermine the security of space assets. In the coming years it will be vital to include UK Space Command in all appropriate discussions to ensure full protection of UK space assets and to allow the command to grow and establish itself.

This paper argues that:

• The Ministry of Defence and Space Command should emphasise doctrinally that space must be understood as both a domain and an enabler, while acknowledging that currently UK defence uses space capabilities more heavily in the enabler role for terrestrial operations than for defensive or offensive operations in space itself.

• There should be a greater emphasis across the services on education about space capabilities, the degree to which terrestrial systems and concepts of operation rely on them, and the potential vulnerabilities created that must be mitigated.

• This education effort should be part of a wider promotion of the message that space is not reserved for a few specialists in Space Command and in space programmes, but instead is critical for all the services. As such, space must be widely understood, used, built into operational planning as a key capability across domains, and protected.

INTRODUCTION

Space is increasingly recognised by UK government as a vital part of defence. It featured prominently in the UK Integrated Review in 2021, and this was followed by the release of three strategy documents: the National Space Strategy in 2021; the Defence Space Strategy in 2022; and the Space Power Doctrine in 2022. The focus on integration – highlighted in both the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh and the associated Defence Command Paper – is intended to counter the new threat environment and is meant to “[enable] the UK to deliver disproportionate effect relative to [its] size”. Space acts a critical enabler for this integration.

However, there is also the recognition that space and the cyber and electromagnetic activities that underpin capabilities “are the least understood domains in UK Defence”. This lack of understanding and lack of priority status is also reflected in budgets: in 2022, a mere £1.4 billion was promised for space capabilities over the following 10 years, apart from the £5 billion to be spent on the UK’s Skynet Programme. Meanwhile, the UK spent £52.8 billion in total on defence in 2022/23.

BACKGROUND

While it appears that government has started to take space more seriously, as shown by the publication of two strategies, a more general understanding of how space enables many defence functions remains absent.

The Space Power Doctrine 2022 document goes into greater detail, outlining how space capabilities should contribute to UK defence’s integrated approach. It also highlights (to an extent) where space already supports and enables capabilities, and explains the current responsibilities and organisations involved in the defence space structures. UK space doctrine states that “the vast majority of military operations could not be sustained without space capabilities”, and space is often referred to as forming part of the “Defence Digital Backbone”. Essentially, space allows defence to know where its own forces are (Positioning, Navigation and Timing [PNT], linked to situational awareness applications), and to know where adversaries and associated threats might be (earth observation/ISR), and it enables satellite communication channels that are vital for command and control (C2) purposes (SATCOM). Space assets are critical to enabling the use of long-range precision weapons for strikes in high-threat areas through the provision of ISR data for targeting, PNT services for guidance and navigation, and SATCOM links for C2 functions.

Most of the UK’s space doctrine deals with explaining what space is, including descriptions of space debris and solar weather. This is necessary to some extent, as it is the UK’s first dedicated space doctrine (previously it was part of airpower doctrine), and one of its aims is “to provide a basis of understanding”. However, this concentration on the basics of space as an environment means that details on how space enables terrestrial capabilities are relatively thin on the ground, and cannot educate readers on terrestrial alternatives or how outages should be dealt with . To make up for this missed opportunity, later iterations of strategy/documentation will need to expand further on how space is used to enable practical military effects. One way to do this, while not losing sight of the basics, could be to update the UK Military Space Primer from 2010 and point towards that document in future updated doctrine documents. This would leave more room in the updated doctrine for information that would help readers appreciate the operational potential of space. It would further promote debate on the subject and help potential beneficiaries engage better with the subject.

This problem is not unique to the UK. Jeffrey Caton has commented that current US space and cyberspace doctrines “often devolve to technical descriptions of their operation”. One of the core purposes of doctrine is to provide “a common basis for understanding the nature and conduct of armed conflict”, but initial theorising can end up taking this more technical approach, as understanding of the potential of space capability to support and enhance military activity has started to permeate to the tactical level but has not yet systematically reached the operational level. Some analysts have argued that doctrine tends to be developed on the basis of practical experience in a given domain or in the context of new tactics, rather than being seen as a prerequisite for practical success, as encapsulated in the phrase “doctrine is the daughter of history”. In the same vein, while systematic thinking about the air domain developed rapidly during the First World War, the RAF was already well established before a unified body of UK airpower doctrine was written.

PURPOSE

What is currently missing from discussions is an assessment of how decision-makers within the UK defence and security community view space, how this thinking has shaped nascent defence space infrastructures, and how the various structures involved affect the future trajectory of using the domain.

The aim of this paper is to outline how UK defence can use space to its fullest extent. Although Space Command was created as recently as 2021, this does not mean that space is a new concept in the UK: rather, space capabilities have formed a little-acknowledged part of UK defence capabilities for decades. With space rising to prominence again around the latter half of the 2010s – evidenced by the establishment of space commands and accompanying strategies and documents in several states – a change in perception is overdue. Space needs to be understood at every level of UK defence, and by policymakers and practitioners alike. This paper outlines how this understanding can be achieved – with education and promotion through Space Command. This perception shift would help the command to fulfil its task of protecting space as a domain.

This paper is primarily aimed at UK defence personnel: both those who are already familiar with space and those who are not. While the information about the threats to space capabilities will not be news to some, the message about education and promotion needs to be heard by all. Meanwhile, the rest of defence needs to hear the message that space is essential to modern conflict at all levels of intensity, and that it is not a specialised area for a few select experts, but rather one that has capabilities and vulnerabilities that need to be understood by all defence professionals.

METHODOLOGY

The research for this paper is based in part on a review of academic literature and extant military doctrine, but it also draws on 15 interviews with experts conducted by the author between October 2022 and August 2023. The interviewees include current senior serving members of the armed forces, academics, and experienced people working in the commercial space sector, selected for their expertise. Most interviews took place online, with two interviews conducted in person and one via phone call. All interview data has been anonymised. Given the paper’s focus on UK defence space, most of the experts interviewed are based in the UK, with only one interviewee based in the US. The UK experience, however, is not unique among relatively new space powers, and some lessons may also be applicable to similarly sized space powers.

STRUCTURE

This paper consists of two main sections. The first section illustrates how space is currently conceived of as both a domain and an enabler, with the current skew towards it primarily acting as an enabler. This may yet change (for example, if on-orbit activities and threats to space assets increase), and the paper uses analogies from the early days of the RAF to showcase this. As interviews revealed, space is often misunderstood, if it is considered at all.

The second section deals with the implications of these current patterns of thinking. The section argues that space is of vital importance for UK defence, and that it is currently not given the prominence and consideration that it should be across the wider armed forces. It also argues that space education across the UK armed forces is vital to understanding: how space already supports operations as a critical enabler; its vulnerabilities; and potential non-space alternatives that might be required to sustain operations if space assets are disrupted or altogether unavailable.

In conclusion, it becomes clear that Space Command must be structured to ensure that the UK’s space capability will flourish – both as an enabler of other domains, through services like PNT, ISR and communications, and in terms of enabling it to fulfil its core role, the protection and defence of space assets.

THE CONCEPTION OF SPACE WITHIN THE MILITARY

To understand space as part of the UK defence framework, it is important to understand how it is thought of in defence decision-making circles. Space has been physically explored for the better part of the past seven decades. However, the thinking around how it can be used for military purposes, and how it should be conceptualised as part of an integrated force, lags behind thinking related to the traditional domains and to cyberspace.

UK space power doctrine considers space a domain, applying NATO’s doctrine that it is an operational domain alongside land, air, maritime, and electromagnetic and cyber. Space is currently conceived of within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as an “independent operational domain” which enables a whole host of capabilities. This seems consistent with both UK and NATO doctrine – after all, space is a physical environment that can be entered, and in which operations can take place.

While the term “domain” is itself contested, it is commonly defined as “a sphere of the operating environment that has physical characteristics requiring unique doctrines, organizations, and equipment for military forces to effectively control and exploit in the conduct of military operations”. This is the case for space: the physical characteristics of the environment require a unique approach.

The laws of physics as they apply in space, the associated speed of travel, and the remoteness of the environment are just a few of the initial factors that need to be considered when operating in space, and they have implications for deployment and maintenance. For example, assets deployed in space, in addition to inherently requiring special design features, also need to cope with the fact that maintenance in space is generally not possible. While in-orbit refuelling, repair and even manufacturing are developing areas of the space industry, they are still far from routine. For the moment at least, a satellite’s lifespan is dictated by its fuel supply. For assets in geostationary orbit this is typically 15 years, although the lifetime of many satellites is stretched out for longer. Space is also different from other domains in that its defence assets are not crewed; the phrase “satellites don’t have mothers” echoes discussions in other domains around the use of UAVs and other remotely operated capabilities, in relation to concerns that the loss of hardware is not considered enough of a deterrent, thereby potentially lowering the threshold of conflict.

In short, the uniqueness of the environment requires targeted thinking that accounts for the specific characteristics of space as a domain. The conceptualisation of space as a domain also carries with it structural, administrative and budgetary recognition. It could even be argued that the categorisation of space as a separate domain was an important part of the justification for the establishment of UK Space Command as a joint two-star headquarters under the RAF in 2021. The primary task of Space Command, which is the protection and defence of space assets, reflects this categorisation as a separate domain.

However, the establishment of Space Command may also send an unhelpful signal to the rest of defence: that space is “taken care of” and is a niche topic that only concerns those working in the command itself. That space is sometimes forgotten about was confirmed by a group captain in the MoD Space Policy team, who stated that space sometimes falls down the priority list for funding, as it is primarily regarded as an enabler for other activities. This highlights why further education and promotion among the rest of the services is a crucial task for Space Command in the coming years, so as to firmly establish the importance of space, its ubiquity in UK defence, and the overall dependence on the domain.

Moreover, viewing space from a domain-centric perspective can also be unhelpful, and viewing space solely in this way limits understanding of how it can influence military operations. As a senior military officer at UK Space Command put it, “we might not win a war using only space, but we will not win a war without it”. The three main roles of space – PNT, ISR and SATCOM – are fundamentally important because they support other, terrestrial, capabilities. Most of the capabilities that space unlocks and enables do not exist in isolation but rather are used as part of wider operational or tactical systems. However, sometimes military users are wholly reliant on SATCOM, especially on early entry deployments or where the ranges or terrain prevent the deployment of terrestrial networks. For example, SATCOM played a vital role for Western forces in Afghanistan, where it was often the only viable communications option for deployed bases or patrols. Space is vital for connectivity in multi-domain settings, for example allowing naval forces to communicate in real time with higher headquarters and ground forces ashore.

THE BALANCE BETWEEN DOMAIN AND ENABLER

Within UK defence circles, space has been treated more as an enabler than as an operational domain (although this attitude may not last). John Klein put it succinctly: “The inherent value of space is what it allows you to do”. This perception has structural implications: the conception of space as primarily an enabler might suggest that it should not be an independent command, in view of historical precedent.

For example, the RAF became an independent service only in 1918. For most of the First World War, aircraft were thought of – in their reconnaissance and artillery observation roles – as enablers for land and maritime forces. Towards the end of the war, though, the increasing use of aircraft in strategic bombing campaigns to disrupt the enemy’s industrial war efforts prompted a shift in the perceived balance between airpower’s importance as an enabler and as a separate domain of warfare. This shift towards thinking about airpower in domain-centric terms was ultimately reflected in the granting to the RAF of its status as an independent service in the final year of the war. As George K Williams wrote, “[the] issue of strategic bombardment was from the outset inextricably conjoined with the creation of the third service”.

While the origins of modern air forces may to some extent serve as an analogy for the origins of national space commands, there are important distinctions to be made. Among them is the fact that air-to-ground and air-to-air combat, if only rudimentary, began to take place almost as soon as the air began to be used for military purposes. While physical combat in orbit would be possible, this has not yet occurred. Furthermore, while space is already providing powerful new benefits for states (echoing the way that the air domain proved revolutionary), it does not provide the same initial benefit of comparatively low cost of entry to achieve transformative effects. Operating in space, as we are often reminded by launch failures and long project timelines, is difficult and expensive.

The duality of space as both a domain and an enabler is not necessarily permanent, as it may evolve into a domain in which direct acts of war happen. If space warfare were to become a regular feature of conflicts, this would even out the balance between space’s domain/enabler roles. The current imbalance would then shift, leading to space doctrine and concepts changing, just as they did in the air domain. For the moment, considering space as a domain as well as an enabler is necessary for the protection of its assets, as well as for creating the budgetary and structural latitude for space within UK defence.

In conclusion, the conception of space as both a domain and an enabler is correct but skewed, which further complicates the way in which it is perceived by the rest of defence. Space Command’s official functions are “delivering day-to-day space operations, growing and training defence’s space workforce, and developing and delivering space equipment programmes”. Treating space as a domain is thus central to the role of Space Command in the delivery of space operations, but it is also important in terms of promoting space, educating the wider forces about their dependence on and the utility of space services, and – perhaps most crucially – protecting the domain by looking after the assets within it. In short, the domain must be protected, so that it can also be used as an enabler. This is why it is important to have a dedicated structure for space in the form of a Space Command: effectively, Space Command deals with space as a domain, while the rest of the services treat space as an enabler for their own conventional capabilities.

FUTURE STEPS FOR UK SPACE

Having discussed how space is currently perceived within UK defence, it is important to consider next steps for UK space, including what Space Command’s role entails. Given the current state of understanding of space discussed above, the priorities for focus can be divided into three distinct categories: education; promotion; and protection of assets.

THE NEED FOR EDUCATION AND PROMOTION

Due to the ubiquitous nature of the space services underpinning many of the conventional capabilities that modern forces depend upon, the services require a broader understanding of space’s contribution to their operations. Space Command’s expertise covers space as a domain, and the threats posed to assets in orbit. While the Command can help with education and promotion, the rest of defence needs to engage more closely and actively improve its baseline knowledge. This includes what kind of disruptions are to be expected, how these can be minimised, and what alternatives are available if satellite services are degraded or fail altogether. As previously outlined, current policy documents – the Space Power Doctrine, the Defence Space Strategy and the National Space Strategy – to some extent explain why space is important, where dependencies lie and what threats to anticipate, but these documents remain rather limited in scope.

In interviews, concerns were expressed about a degree of myopia among the services; but it was also noted that this might change as thinking about cross-domain integration evolves, with space becoming more prominent in discussions. A senior government official at the MoD remarked that there was “education left to do”, and a “low space IQ across departments”. There was a general consensus among interviewees that more space education was required in defence circles not immediately adjacent to space, with Space Command playing a key role in bridging that gap. The need for education was further emphasised in a House of Commons Defence Committee report in 2023, which also acknowledged that modification and development of training was underway.

Some measures are already being taken to address the issue: the Space Power Doctrine outlines the idea that space is part of an integrated approach, partly enabled and coordinated through a network of space liaison officers. Although this goes some way towards alleviating the problem, the presence of a few space experts scattered around the services is not going to prompt a seismic change in understanding. In fact, the designation of space experts risks sending the wrong message: that space is so complicated that it is the domain solely of specialised experts, rather than an area that concerns everyone.

Another vehicle for education is the Space Academy, which is to open at the end of 2024 as part of the UK Defence Academy. Including space as part of wider defence education and situating it naturally among the other domains is the right approach: space forms a crucial part of defence infrastructure and should not be treated as so specialised that it is reserved for a select few.

In interviews, one senior RAF officer noted that the problem with attempting to spread knowledge and awareness of space more widely among defence was that content was overly complicated, requiring the topic to be communicated repeatedly. This highlights the need for marketing as well as education: it is not just space’s importance that needs to be communicated, but also that the topic is not as difficult as is sometimes perceived.

Part of the problem could be how the topic is currently explained. Everyday end-users of space services – such as a soldier using a satellite phone – might be familiar with the space-enabled device in their hand, but not with the space threats that could degrade its functionality. Although considering space solely from a domain perspective facilitates the scrutiny of space threats and other important environment-specific topics, it all too often obscures the enabler elements and neglects the tactical level at which space plays a key role in terrestrial activities. The soldier with the satellite phone may not consider themselves to be a space user, despite the degree to which the success of their mission, or even their survival, depends on it.

When communicating why space matters, therefore, it might be more fruitful to stress the domain’s potential as an enabler, as well as the number of terrestrial capabilities that could not operate in their current capacity without it. The current deficit of clear communication creates a gap, whereby understanding at the operational level is often lost. This is problematic given that understanding of potential capabilities, vulnerabilities and dependencies is necessary at the operational level to ensure that disruptions to space services do not catch troops off guard, and that reversionary measures can be implemented quickly.

It will therefore be Space Command’s fundamental task over the coming years to educate and to spread awareness among the rest of the joint force. Space liaison officers are a good start, but they are not a panacea – space is not a niche topic and ought no longer to be treated as such. It is vital to ensure that space quickly becomes part of defence’s “business as usual” activity so that its importance is more broadly recognised. While space’s unique characteristics affect how it fits into the defence framework, treating it as a specialised, discrete part of defence will hinder full integration and contribute to the perception of space as an overly complicated department with a high barrier to entry. A modern fighting force that is truly integrated cannot function if it is unaware of how one of its main enablers works (or if its fighting force is put off learning about it because the subject matter is considered too complicated). This does not mean that space specialists are unnecessary – in fact, they are very much needed, and well placed within Space Command – but space should not be regarded as a field that only concerns a few specialists.

Space Command is currently best placed to drive the education and promotion campaign that is necessary if this understanding – that space is everyone’s concern – is to be attained. One of the key requirements will be developing skills associated with education and promotion. Cyber security in the civilian sector provides a useful analogy. Since every company uses the internet to some extent, most companies provide cyber security training for their staff, for example to make them aware of phishing emails and the ways in which their organisation could become vulnerable in the event of a breach. In the same way, every soldier who handles space-enabled equipment (a category that likely includes most service personnel) needs to be aware of the limitations of the tool and the threats to its associated systems. The absence of such awareness risks late detection or incorrect addressing of counter-space measures. Moreover, users need to be acquainted with the backup options available (or at least be aware of the degree of risk if there are no backup options). Although recent combat operations undertaken by the British armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan did not involve significant contests in the electromagnetic spectrum, the experience of the current war in Ukraine suggests that this situation would change in a peer-to-peer (or near-peer) conflict.

THE NEED FOR PROTECTION

The effectiveness of space assets has increasingly led to them being seen as potential targets. Geospatial analytics company Hawkeye 360 has reported that there was “increased GPS interference in and around Ukraine in the months leading up to the February attack as well as since”. Similarly, Elon Musk reported attacks against the mega-constellation Starlink – the space-enabled internet provider that has supplied Ukrainian troops with much-needed connectivity. On the morning of the invasion of Ukraine, another space-enabled internet provider, Viasat, was targeted in a cyber attack, although it is unclear to what extent one of its clients, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, was affected by the resultant outage. What is clear, though, is that adversaries and competitors have realised the utility of space assets, and will endeavour to ensure they are disrupted or made inaccessible.

This is further evidenced by Russia’s focus on information dominance. Space, as one of the major conduits for information flows, is a crucial attack vector. Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities did not initially prove as dominant in Ukraine as had been assumed, primarily due to a lack of in-depth Russian planning during the opening phases of the invasion. While Russia’s use of EW capabilities has increased significantly in both scope and sophistication since the opening stages of the war, these have not been particularly successful in denying Ukraine access to satellite-enabled communications, in part due to the resilience of the Starlink constellation. Nevertheless, they are having a negative effect on positioning, thus “slowing down vital kill chains and imposing significant limitations on Ukrainian reconnaissance in depth”.

Despite the limited initial use of EW capabilities in Ukraine, it must be assumed that space capabilities, such as SATCOM, would be at least partially disrupted in any future peer-to-peer (or near-peer) conflict. This is important, especially given the ubiquity and utility of the electromagnetic spectrum for C2 purposes, including communications, coordination and targeting. Western forces largely conduct training in environments that are unrealistically permissive from an electromagnetic spectrum perspective. Likewise, most recent Western combat experience has been in expeditionary operations where the space environment has been largely uncontested. For example, whereas SATCOM ground stations could become targets for physical attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, the satellites and the links themselves were not at risk. In 2003, Iraqi EW systems were present and alleged to have been provided by Russia, but they proved incapable of jamming US systems and were ultimately destroyed.

The consistent attempts to target space-enabled capabilities in the war in Ukraine are not an outlier. Both Russia and China view Western (and specifically US) dependence on space as a weakness to be exploited. While China and Russia both run significant counter-space programmes, it is not only space powers that are capable of disrupting or destroying space assets. Cyber attacks against space systems and direct attacks/sabotage targeting ground stations are just two ways in which a non-space power could disrupt space systems. Attacks in the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and spoofing, have become part and parcel of modern warfare and could even be carried out by non-state actors, given the widespread commercial availability of jammers.

In response to the degree of dependence on space services and the rapidly expanding threat they face, the US Army and the US Air Force have already begun training under GPS-denied conditions – Exercise Red Flag in 2018 was a prominent example. In all NATO countries, services dependent on satellite-enabled services – air forces, armies and navies – should increase reversionary training. In many cases, potential reversionary options already exist for situations where space services are degraded or denied. For example, GPS alternatives for the Royal Navy have been suggested, such as an automated celestial navigation system, magnetic anomaly navigation and bathymetric navigation. Even where one method may not provide a comprehensive service, the combination of alternative navigation methods could offer resilience in scenarios where GPS is disrupted or completely unavailable. In this instance, a primary, alternative, contingency and emergency (PACE)-like approach, as used for communications planning, could prove equally useful for PNT and other space systems.

In conclusion, it is inevitable both that space will be a critical enabler in future wars and that space assets will be specifically targeted, given their centrality to modern capabilities. Consequently, understanding of space needs to extend far beyond those immediately responsible for space assets, reaching out across the whole breadth of modern forces. This highlights the necessity of education at a general level in defence about the dependencies and vulnerabilities of systems relying on space assets, alongside appropriate involvement of Space Command in programmes to perform its core task of ensuring that assets are defended against space threats.

STRUCTURAL AND ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR “PROTECT AND DEFEND”

While UK Space Command is still in its early days, the structures that are being shaped now will be fundamental not only to the command’s success but also to how effectively space can enable wider cross-domain integration. As Bleddyn Bowen puts it, “the primary questions of a space force should be who can manage space infrastructure and its protection best, and which branches of the military should engage in counterspace missions, most often involving terrestrially based weapons”.

When it was inaugurated in 2021, UK Space Command was established under the financial umbrella of the RAF, with its headquarters located in High Wycombe. This was at least in part due to the fact that most suitably qualified and experienced personnel on space issues in defence were deemed to work in the RAF already. At the time, there were discussions about whether the command should sit under Strategic Command, given that it is a joint enabler and essential to integration, and also considering that the Skynet programme, which at approximately £5 billion makes up the vast majority of the UK defence space budget, already falls within its remit. However, the scope of operations, capability development and training, and the fact that almost 70% of the UK Space Command workforce comes from the RAF, led to the command being formed under the RAF. This decision was echoed in the German armed forces (also in 2021), and is in line with several other countries (including France, which created its Air and Space Force in 2020). UK Space Command is not a single service function, however. It is a joint command that acts as the UK’s nerve centre for space, and is staffed by personnel from all three services, although administrative staff and logistical underpinnings are provided by Air Command.

There are three questions to be answered in this context:

• Should Space Command be an independent service?

• Is it best placed as a command or headquarters under the auspices of the RAF, as is currently the case?

• Should it instead be moved to Strategic Command?

It is currently not clear whether Space Command will eventually outgrow its parent organisation and become an independent service. For the time being, however, it is too small to function as a standalone service. Leaving aside budget considerations, it is probably wise for Space Command to be made its own service only if exclusive space operations become substantial enough for the enabler/domain balance to tip towards the domain end of the spectrum. As long as space is primarily used as an enabler, it seems most reasonable for the command to fall under one of the more established services.

If Space Command is not an independent service, then, what is the best way to carve out a nerve centre for space when decisions made by Space Command will affect all the other services? How should capacity and responsibility for different space functions, such as ISR, SATCOM and PNT, be allocated within the services? UK space power doctrine suggests that, where further clarification is required to avoid doubt, a mission should be labelled according to its effect rather than its means. This, however, poses a question about the extent to which it is possible to have exclusively space missions. Space is “a prime integrator” and is very rarely used in isolation. What are operated are assets that send data to ground stations, which in turn assist terrestrial assets – whether by providing images through ISR, coordinates via PNT, or data through SATCOM. Protective measures for satellites would fall squarely in the space mission category, though current anti-satellite measures are most likely to come in the form of jamming, spoofing and cyber attacks – all of which attack the links (and potentially terrestrial elements such as ground stations), rather than directly targeting the space assets themselves.

All of this suggests that Space Command is probably best placed under Strategic Command at this stage, for two reasons. First, if Space Command is tasked with the protection and defence of space assets against attacks (most of which are likely to take place in the electromagnetic and cyber realms), it would be best placed to work with the command that already owns most of those capabilities. Second, moving away from the top-level budget of the RAF would send a powerful cultural message that space enables the full spectrum of military capabilities and affects everyone, not just aviators.

There are deep intra-dependencies within each domain, and perhaps especially within space, which acts as the glue that holds the other domains together. Therefore, losing access to the space capabilities that are crucial for achieving operational success might be particularly disruptive for the complex system of interdependencies across the air, land, maritime, cyber and space domains. In interviews, one official stressed that the potential risk of overlap was not unique to space, but happened in other areas as well. This seems to suggest that an overlap of space roles mentioned in the Space Power Doctrine is widespread across defence and is actually a “growing pain” of the continuing trend towards integration. As a former signaller reflected during interviews, the main problem with integration was that people saw it as a destination rather than as a journey that in reality never ends, due to technology change, with no final end state.

The pervasiveness of space means that there is also a danger of insufficient involvement and consultation of Space Command on projects or systems that concern space. A prime example of where this could be potentially harmful is the Skynet programme, a hardened constellation of X-band satellites that provides all beyond line of sight communications to the UK military. The programme has been running since the late 1960s, and the next generation of satellites is already being planned: Skynet 6A has been promised to provide “more capacity, speed and greater versatility”. The Skynet programme, despite being a critical space asset, falls under Strategic Command, and it is the biggest UK defence space project. While there are long-term ambitions to move the programme to sit under Space Command, there are no immediate plans to do so. However, other new space capabilities being developed, such as the ISR constellation Istari and the integrator system Minerva, are planned to fall within Space Command’s remit.

As the UK’s biggest defence space project, it may seem counterintuitive that Skynet is not allocated to Space Command. However, given the advanced stage the project had reached by the time that Space Command was being created, and the project’s sheer scale, its placement was a logical decision. A huge project such as Skynet requires a command that can support it with the scale of staffing it needs. As a space industry expert has observed, Space Command is currently not “configured” to take on large projects. Furthermore, there is experience within Strategic Command to help guide how Skynet ought to be run – including how its services can reach the “frontline” when necessary. This is in part enabled through the Chief Information Officer within the MoD, and guided by the Digital Strategy for Defence, ensuring that “frontline forces … have real-time access to data”. Taking Skynet out of these tried-and-tested structures, while attempting to manage such a big project and learning “on the go”, would have been counterproductive, and could have led to the loss of crucial expertise, such as appropriate bandwidth for operations. In the view of a senior military officer at UK Space Command, taking on the Skynet programme at such an early stage of development of the Command would have caused significant issues, given the size of the programme, and would have been all-encompassing.

This is not to say that the inclusion of Skynet under Space Command in the future would not strengthen the command (albeit requiring additional budget and people). Space Command is already responsible for the “protect and defend” element of Skynet – ensuring that it is safe from hostile intent. Moreover, Skynet 6 will be in orbit for many years and will carry out critical mission support, making it a legitimate target for adversaries. Given the evolving nature of space threats and the importance of the service provided, it has become evident that additional protection is needed beyond the measures that were initially specified at the start of the programme. Ultimately, the problem with Skynet has been that, despite the large budget, it would be challenging to meet the requirements of protect and defend from within Skynet’s existing funding. This is because when the requirements were set, the initial threat assessment assumed a different geopolitical situation (and a different risk level for satellites). When Space Command was established, it was relatively late in the process to influence the requirements for Skynet 6A and Enduring Capability, and for agreeing the appropriate balance of responsibility between Space Command and Strategic Command for delivering the protect and defend mission. The case of Skynet is perhaps unique, in the sense that the timing of the establishment of Space Command did not lend itself to sufficient consultation. However, it is an example that shows that the vulnerability and protection of satellites need to be considered more extensively. Where compromises had to be made for the current programme, this has been considered a lesson learned, and significant progress is being made towards understanding how future Skynet spacecraft can be protected and defended.

This dynamic is not unusual for a defence programme of this scale. Given the long development and deployment timeframes usually involved, security requirements can quickly become outdated. However, in most major defence projects, modifications to hardware and configuration can be made at multiple points during a capability lifecycle to improve responsiveness to evolving threats. Space assets are somewhat unique, in that generally only the software can be updated once an asset has been placed in orbit. Therefore, a greater degree of horizon scanning is required, and software adaptability built in to ensure the ability to protect the asset throughout its lifespan. This is particularly true for satellites in geostationary orbit (like Skynet), which remain in orbit for longer periods of time.

The lesson must be that the protection and defence requirements of any future space asset need to be decided within Space Command and included in the core specifications from the inception of any project. Given that Space Command will ultimately hold operational responsibility for Skynet, the way that the programme has been managed in terms of ownership creates a gap between those who designed the programme and those who will be ultimately responsible for it. This not only increases the potential vulnerability of a strategic asset, due to a lack of focus on protect and defend requirements during development, but also potentially risks a fledgling Space Command looking ineffective in the event of any issues with Skynet 6 Enduring Capability once in service, which could hamper the command’s future development.

The Skynet programme serves as an example for the wider structure: bigger projects that require a large budget and many personnel are best placed outside Space Command, at least while the command matures, but must involve the command to the extent that it can assure its future mission of protecting and defending space assets once they enter service. In this way, the “domain” thinking sits within Space Command, while the “enabler” elements stay with the relevant parts of the services or UK Strategic Command.

Space will become increasingly contested as the reliance on space-enabled assets grows. It is therefore vital that modern armed forces are ready for this contest – this cannot be done with only a handful of people in a single command recognising the potential dangers. Thus, the setting up of a dedicated Space Command should not send the message to the rest of the force that space is now “taken care of” – space operations do not happen in isolation from other domains.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

UK Space Command was formed in 2021. Now, three years after its inception and the publication of the National and Defence Space Strategies, important lessons have been learned. Global trends, not least those observed during the war in Ukraine, have made it abundantly clear that space services are not a niche capability. Space is a ubiquitous and essential integrating layer for modern military operations, and as a result it is also increasingly being directly and indirectly targeted by adversaries.

With space underlying so many military capabilities, space knowledge cannot be left to a few specialists in UK defence. Rather, its dependencies and vulnerabilities and non-space-based alternatives need to be widely understood. An understanding of space and what it can do for UK defence and security needs to permeate all of UK defence, and be promoted at every level to guarantee continuous access to space and the capabilities it enables.

The inclusion of a Space Academy at the Defence College is a step in the right direction, as it further drives home the message that space does not require special treatment, as a discrete entity, but is instead vitally integrated into the way that defence operates. Widespread understanding of how space enables modern warfare will be fundamental to early threat detection, the prevention of service disruption and, ultimately, unlocking true integration. It is therefore vital that space education is made a core part of broader military education and training within defence.

As well as enabling this wider education, a core role for Space Command in the coming years will be the protection of space capabilities. As space becomes more woven into defence structures, and space capabilities become more resilient (but also dispersed across a wider array of constellations and services), the challenge of protection will become more complex. Space Command needs the tools and the people to counter these threats. This requires involving Space Command from the beginning of projects so that the security of space assets, rather than being an afterthought, is designed in from the start. Space security must be considered at every level, and from the beginning – otherwise a multitude of terrestrial capabilities may become vulnerable or even be rendered ineffective through attacks on the space assets that enable them to function.

While the concept of space power is gaining importance and visibility across the military, it is now time to engage the wider community of space beneficiaries across UK defence in much greater detail. Space is an enabler for many fundamental capabilities, such as the orbital ISR, PNT and SATCOM that make modern warfare possible. Space is an integrator of many capabilities and functions. It is therefore important to recognise and counter threats to these functions, both from the harsh space environment and from adversaries, who are increasingly investing in tools that make disruption or denial of space-enabled capabilities possible. Thus there is a need for wider education and promotion of space within the armed forces, as well as for potential structural changes to both programme management and service ownership to ensure that Space Command can ultimately fulfil its role of protecting and defending the domain.

Juliana Suess is the Research Fellow on Space Security in the Military Sciences team at RUSI and the host of the War in Space podcast. She was previously Project Officer and Research Analyst at RUSI International. Her research interests include global space governance, counter-space capabilities and space warfare.