UK On Israel–Palestine

As Sir Keir Starmer’s cabinet sets about establishing what Labour policies mean in government for the first time in more than 14 years, his ministers will find there are some issues that will prove as thorny in government as they did in opposition. When it comes to foreign policy, one such example would be the Middle East; and when it comes to the Middle East, one such example would be Israel and the Palestinians. Israel’s war on Gaza has gone on for more than nine months, following the Hamas-led attack on Israel in October 2023, with the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, stating that civilians in Gaza are being pushed into, “ever deeper circles of hell”, due to the ensuing humanitarian situation arising from the Israeli campaign. On 7 July, David Lammy, the UK’s new foreign secretary, said that the UK seeks a “balanced position” on the current situation. How might that look on Israel–Gaza, and Israel–Palestine more generally?

The UK and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

During the last Conservative period of government, from 2010 until this year, relations between Israel and the UK reached an apex of support signified by a 2030 roadmap agreement signed in 2023, establishing widespread cooperation in a variety of fields. At the same time, the British government’s official position on Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories remained transparent; repeated declarations by London indicated its view that international law considered East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank to be occupied territory, and settlements therein illegal. (Indeed, a Conservative minister of state, Alan Duncan, spoke at RUSI in 2014 to make this point quite clear.)

The last year has been a challenging one for British interests in the region; the 7 October attack on Israel, followed by Israel’s bombardment of Gaza, raised the threat of regional conflict, be it between Israel and Iran, Israel and Lebanon, as well as other theatres. As this author has mentioned with regard to Europe in another brief: a stable wider Arab world is in the UK’s ultimate interest; a wider Arab world and Middle East region in turmoil is precisely the opposite. Indeed, due to British interests being affected, the UK committed the use of force in the Red Sea against the Houthis, as a result of the latter’s escalation on international shipping lanes in the Red Sea – an escalation that would not have taken place had the war in Gaza been averted, or a ceasefire come to.

Moreover, London’s diplomatic capital internationally is being impacted by the perception that the UK’s commitment to the “rules-based order” is not as absolute as it proclaims, because of the assessment that the UK has been lacking in balance vis-à-vis Israel–Palestine. As one G7 diplomat told the Financial Times months ago, “What we said about Ukraine has to apply to Gaza. Otherwise we lose all our credibility”. The UK stands in need of more, not less such diplomatic capital, with all the challenges on the horizon.

Immediate Future: Aid and Arms Sales

In the immediate future, the restoration of UK funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), announced by the Foreign Secretary on Friday 19 July, is a welcome step that ought to be followed up by British moves to improve aid transfers to the Palestinian occupied territories. Criticisms by the former Conservative government about the difficulty to get aid into Gaza due to Israeli obstacles remain valid; restoration of support to UNRWA is necessary to reduce the humanitarian crisis, but there remain other difficulties to be addressed.

Another near-term topic that is likely to come up again quite soon is that of arms sales to Israel by the UK. While it is true that such arms sales represent a small proportion of arms transfers to Israel, as the former foreign secretary Lord Cameron pointed out, such a point is immaterial to HMG’s legal obligations. Under the UK’s strategic export licensing criteria (SELC), London is required to prevent the transfer of military equipment where there is a clear or overriding risk that such equipment might be used to facilitate a serious violation of international law.

While London is not in the business of telling the Israeli population how to vote, the British government should make clear to its ally what its own values are

More than 130 parliamentarians in the last parliament argued this was already the case, joining many different human rights and aid organisations. Crucially, the Foreign Affairs Committee chair in the last parliament, Alicia Kearns, repeatedly raised the issue of whether or not export licence applications for Israel have been referred to ministers over the past year. If the UK were to take the step of suspending or restricting such export licences, they would be joining a number of their allies; Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Canada, Italy, and Spain have already done so.

Additionally, it may be that HMG legal advice has already recommended such a step. When in opposition, Foreign Secretary Lammy criticised the then Conservative-led government for not publishing the legal advice provided; it would be prudent for him to do so now, in order to show that a page has been turned in this regard.

Of the short-term decisions, this is perhaps the most difficult, because it would place the UK in a place different from its close allies in the US, France and Germany. Simultaneously, it is important to note that previous British governments, including those of David Cameron, Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, and Margaret Thatcher, all suspended arms sales to Israel on different occasions – the precedent has already been set.

Medium Term: the ICC and Palestine Recognition

In the medium term, there are two critical areas that are likely to be raised. The first relates to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICC prosecutor general, Karim Khan. Prominent US Republican politicians, including the newly announced candidate for the US vice-presidency, J D Vance, have called for sanctions against and an investigation into Khan, as a result of the latter’s calling for arrest warrants against Israeli officials. The Biden administration has also confirmed it wants to work with Congress to penalise the ICC. As a signatory of the Rome Statute that established the ICC, in addition to the fact that Khan is a British citizen, the UK ought to vigorously defend the ICC and the prosecutor general. London’s discreet challenge against ICC jurisdiction over Israeli officials, lodged in the last weeks of the last government, should be withdrawn; its continuation, particularly given the weak legal basis and existing challenges against the ICC, would be viewed as lacklustre support for the ICC.

The second medium-term issue pertains to immediate recognition of the State of Palestine, which was, until relatively recently, a Labour policy. Labour has now changed that policy to indicate that recognition will happen as part of a peace process, rather than at the conclusion of that process, and that Labour was committed to such recognition. The reluctance to immediately recognise the State of Palestine is primarily due to a desire to avoid a rift with US President Joe Biden, which is understandable given London’s overarching security architecture. But it is not a foregone conclusion that London’s recognition would create a rift of any consequence with Washington DC. A total of 144 of the 193 member states of the UN already recognise the State of Palestine, including a majority of European states – their relations with Washington DC have been unaffected.

The question is: given the option of recognition, should the UK still resist it? British recognition of a Palestinian state would not immediately bring one into existence, so one could argue it is merely symbolic, and hardly consequential. The opposing argument is that recognition by the UK is qualitatively different than many other countries, given London’s historic role in the Israel–Palestine question. When Norway recognised a Palestinian state earlier this year, it was essentially stating that Oslo no longer believed in the Oslo Peace Process. The more such political messages are sent, the more pressure there is for a political process to be reinvigorated, rather than the continuation of an unstable status quo.

Long term: UK Political Convergence and Divergence on Israel–Palestine

Finally, there are longer term issues that the UK will have to address. The developing nature of the Israeli political spectrum has seen over the past decade a widening and mainstreaming of the Israeli far-right, with not only attitudes hardening on the margins, but in the centre. The latest such example was the near-entirety of the Israeli Knesset voted against Palestinian statehood, and thus the two-state solution itself, on the 18th of July; a political settlement that the international community, including the UK, has rallied behind for decades. Extreme radical views are expressed not only by members of far-right political parties, but also within traditionally centre-right ones, such as Likud. While London is not in the business of telling the Israeli population how to vote, the British government should make clear to its ally what its own values are.

London should consider re-evaluating the 2030 roadmap agreement that was signed with Israel in 2023

To that end, the sanctions regime that the UK FCDO has, and which it instituted against two extremist groups in Israel in May, should be widened. The settlement movement in the West Bank has not been infiltrated by extremist elements that need to be isolated; rather, the settlement movement is in itself an illegal enterprise, supported by the Israeli government and military. British courts, British politicians and the British government have made it abundantly clear on numerous occasions that East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza are all occupied territories, and that the occupying power is the State of Israel. HMG policy should make it clear that settlement activity writ large ought to result in sanctions. Moreover, as the ICC and International Court of Justice (ICJ) investigations continue, it is likely that there will be Israeli, as well as Hamas figures, that are sanctioned or the subject of arrest warrants. London should prepare for this, as it is likely that highly senior figures in the Israeli government will be affected, and London ought to make it clear that it upholds the independence of both the ICC and the ICJ.

London already has a strongly effective system of restrictions and sanctions with regard to Hamas and support for terrorism, via legal and political measures, and little more seems necessary in that regard. However, in coordination with particularly European allies, which has substantial leverage with regard to the Palestinian Authority owing to existing EU aid packages, the UK should focus on “more for more”; not by threatening a withdrawal of aid, particularly at a time of tremendous suffering, but by proposing increased access to European and British markets for Palestinian trade, in exchange for improvements in governance by Palestinian authorities.

Given the ongoing widespread concerns around violations of international humanitarian law, London should furthermore consider re-evaluating the 2030 roadmap agreement that was signed with Israel in 2023. That agreement has significant impact on bilateral relations on military support and trade, among a wide variety of other fields. Given that Israel is currently in the dock at the ICJ for genocide charges, a suspension of the agreement until the outcome of the case at least, would seem prudent.

Finally, the UK, while remaining aware and humble about its ability to directly impact the situation on the ground, should nonetheless recognise its tremendous indirect leveraging power. The UK enjoys a privileged relationship with the US, which has the most direct consequential impact on the Israel–Palestine question. London also has extensive and deep contacts with Arab states that are extremely important with regard to the conflict, particularly Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE. If the US were to use the leverage it has over the Israelis, and Arab states were to simultaneously use their leverage over the Palestinians, the prospects for a genuine and sustainable peace settlement in Israel–Palestine would be far easier to materialise.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been ongoing for decades, and it is tempting to see it as an unsolvable foreign policy issue. But such defeatist thinking led to the political dynamic that eventually led to the terrible events of 7 October, and sent the region into a deeply dangerous spiral of escalation and violence. UK national security interests stipulate that London further prospects for a wider peace in the region, if only to hold back the possibility of wider escalation of violence, and corresponding impacts on British interests.

H A Hellyer is the Senior Associate Fellow of RUSI. Specialising in geopolitics, security studies, political economy, and belief, he has more than 20 years of experience in governmental, corporate advisory, and academic environments in Europe, USA, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.